A Bid for the Future

Four preliminary bids arrive by noon. The committee's outside bank receives them through a controlled data room, timestamps each upload, and preserves originals. Summaries on our screen omit bidder names during initial comparison. A bid is an expression of interest, not a funded promise. Financing conditions and diligence can change every number.

June forces the bank to add columns for direct jobs, agency jobs, honored obligations, and assets moved outside Illinois. Rina adds financing certainty and cash required before close. Bidders did not format answers that way, so the committee orders follow-up instead of letting banker format define value.

One bidder would buy the real estate, license the brand, and close Wondervale for eighteen months. Its plan eliminates thirty-eight percent of positions and sells the North Service Complex.

A second keeps the park open but outsources food, cleaning, and costume work. It assumes agency labor does not inherit the workforce compact.

Another bidder purchases attractions separately, moves two signature rides to another state, and treats community accessibility data as company intellectual property despite the council's ownership terms.

Ellison Ridge submits the fourth bid. It converts debt to equity, preserves most direct jobs for one year, restores Jonah's approved vendors, and receives control rights over capital spending.

Employee board representation appears in none of the bids; two substitute advisory councils without votes, and one treats the Access Council license as a Vale asset. Lena's lab sends notice that raw data cannot enter diligence. The bank removes disputed folders and records prior viewers. Correcting ownership slows the sale and prevents repetition from becoming title.

June taps the bidder column. "Every bidder calls destruction efficiency."

Adrian calculates net proceeds after debt, taxes, closure liabilities, and protected worker obligations. The highest headline price produces the second-lowest recovery because it assumes Vale absorbs severance and environmental costs. His analysis is useful and cannot save us.

I ask whether a bidder can be required to honor the compact. Transaction counsel says the committee may score labor commitments, but proxy holders can challenge rejection of a higher financial offer. The city subsidy agreement and existing contracts bind some obligations. Others depend on a buyer accepting them or on workers enforcing successor clauses.

June asks the question nobody in the banker presentation considered.

"Can employees bid for governance rights without buying the whole park?"

The banker begins explaining the limits of employee financing. She stops him.

"I did not ask whether workers can become billionaires by Friday. Could a stakeholder group offer cash, operating commitments, and debt support in exchange for governance rights that make Wondervale harder to strip?"

Rina turns to the sale-process rules. The written consent requires consideration of bids for ownership or material strategic alternatives. A recapitalization with worker, community, city, and outside-capital participation could qualify. It would need committed money, credible revenue, and a structure acceptable to debt holders.

June closes the pension schedule. "Pensions are off limits. No worker retirement fund guarantees family debt."

"Agreed," I say.

Adrian proposes a consortium model: Vale contributes equity concessions; city and community partners contribute grants or program contracts; an outside investor provides new capital; employees receive protected board seats and compact rights rather than personal debt. Every contribution must have an independent valuation. The family cannot price its shares while asking workers to sacrifice.

June asks who loses control. Adrian answers: the Vale family must surrender vetoes, accept independent directors, and dilute ownership. Employees gain governance without guaranteed profit. Public partners require performance conditions. Outside capital still demands return.

June circles Adrian's last line. "Put every loss in the term sheet. Including workers does not make a consortium clean."

Rina prohibits using employee legal-trust funds as capital. The trust may pay worker-selected advisers, never finance family debt. Hart's office may explore a revenue contract but cannot pledge grants without hearing. Lena's lab may license programming at market rate, never donate participant data.

His idea brings him back into the work without restoring his command. I ask the committee to retain him for this analysis under the same limits. June demands an employee-selected co-adviser. The committee approves both.

By four, the stakeholder consortium has founding participants but no money. The employee trust, Access Council, community lab, and city development office sign a nonbinding exploration agreement. Vale signs only as an information provider. Rina holds the model. June controls worker authorization. Lena's lab board must approve any community contribution separately.

The city office tests whether a performance contract could purchase public-access programming rather than subsidize ownership. Its lawyer creates a two-page eligibility note at 4:18 and files it in the municipal portal. The note says procurement rules require an open process and council approval. Wondervale cannot assume it will win. A public contract could become revenue; it cannot be booked before competition.

The Access Council proposes licensing its standards to whichever operator honors participant rights. The Vale consortium receives no automatic preference. By keeping its independence, the council gains credibility while the consortium loses certainty. June requires the same principle for the compact: enforceable terms earn worker support; current family control earns none.

Adrian asks the bank to model a sale in which Vale retains a minority stake and relinquishes operational veto. I feel the personal loss before the financial logic. The model may show that saving Wondervale requires my family to stop controlling it. The committee accepts the scenario and assigns valuation to an adviser who has never worked for Vale.

Rina makes the adviser's fee fixed rather than success-based. Payment tied to closing would reward speed. The fixed contract costs more upfront and removes one reason to call a destructive bid inevitable. The committee publishes amount, scope, and conflicts before work begins.

June wins a written right for worker counsel to challenge assumptions. Worker counsel gains the power to force correction when a model erases agency staff, relocation costs, or compact duties, while price remains outside its control. Challenges and responses enter the portal before recommendations.

The agreement protects pensions, participant data, and wage claims while leaving future family control undecided. Transaction counsel creates it; all parties sign through their own systems, and the committee portal receives certified copies. The vulnerability is fragmentation. Any participant can leave, and public money requires hearings that may outlast the sale clock.

An outside bank grants the consortium the same initial data-room window as bidders. That equality creates a cost. Competitors may claim the process favors insiders; consortium members must disclose conflicts and cannot see other bids beyond standardized summaries. Adrian may analyze Vale's debt but cannot solicit Ellison Ridge.

The committee grants ten days for structure and thirty for operating revenue. Other bidders get the same clarification window. Advisory fees begin now from the transaction reserve, reducing recovery cash. Fairness has a visible price.

June schedules separate worker assemblies so managers cannot dominate one large meeting. The legal trust holds attendance and comments. Vale receives aggregated terms, never critic names.

Rina builds a thirty-day survival model. Closed attractions remain excluded. Benefits, wages, safety, and paid community work stay protected. Winter attendance is uncertain, and current revenue declines too quickly to support new capital.

At the evening briefing, employees do not celebrate. June tells them a consortium is permission to attempt a bid, not ownership. Workers will vote before any governance term becomes binding. The Access Council refuses to endorse until its data and licensing rights appear in writing.

A ride operator asks whether refusing bidders could cost every job. June says yes. Adrian says accepting the highest price could cost jobs more slowly and with fewer rights. Their refusal to promise survival keeps the discussion honest.

I look at Adrian across the room. "What would make this credible?"

He answers with the humility of someone whose prior financing certainty became evidence.

"Independent capital, enforceable governance, and revenue that exists outside our projections."

Rina marks every unsupported revenue line as zero until an outside source can verify it.

Rina closes the model. "You have thirty days to show the consortium can earn enough to operate. Without credible revenue, governance rights are promises attached to an empty park."